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The environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data provided in firms’ sustainability 
reports is often unaudited. If ESG information disclosed by firms is not reliable, a firm’s 
greenwashing behavior can be a barrier to integrating ESG factors into investment decisions. 
In this paper, we study mechanisms to lessen firms’ greenwashing behavior in ESG 
dimensions holistically. Firstly, we identify “greenwashers” as firms which seem very 
transparent and reveal large quantities of ESG data but perform poorly in ESG aspects. By 
creating peer-relative greenwashing scores for a cross-country dataset comprised by 1925 
large-cap firms, we measure the extent to which large-cap firms engage in greenwashing. We 
find evidence that greenwashing behavior in ESG dimensions can be deterred by scrutiny 
from (a) independent directors, (b) institutional investors, (c) influential public interests via a 
less corrupted country system, and (d) being cross-listed. Our results suggest that the two 
firm-level governance factors are most effective at attenuating firms’ misleading disclosure 
relating to ESG dimensions.      
 
Keywords: Greenwashing, ESG disclosure, ESG performance, sustainability, stakeholder 
engagement, corporate governance. 
 
JEL: G3, G15. 
  






In the last decade, there has been a growing call for investors to incorporate 
environmental, social, and governance (hereafter ESG) factors into their investment process. 
However, incorporating ESG variables into the asset selection process is made more difficult 
for investors when companies “greenwash,” i.e. when firms make misleading ESG 
disclosures. This concern motivates us to explore the mechanisms that could deter firms from 
engaging in ESG greenwashing. Moreover, the prior ESG disclosure and greenwashing 
literature focus only on gauging best practice for each dimension of ESG separately. While 
the greenwashing literature discusses the presence of symbolic strategies adopted by firms, 
very few studies have empirically explored the circumstances under which companies are 
engaged in greenwashing (King and Lenox, 2000; Bromley and Powell, 2012; McDonnell 
and King, 2013; Del Bosco and Misani, 2016; Marquis et al., 2016; Van Halderen et al., 
2016). Our study aims to fill this research gap by studying the quantity and quality of firms’ 
disclosure in the three dimensions of ESG holistically. By creating a peer-relative 
greenwashing score, we can measure the magnitude of a firms’ greenwashing behavior in 
ESG issues. Covering an international sample of large-cap companies across 47 countries and 
territories, our empirical results suggest that governance and ownership factors play an 
important role in dissuading ESG greenwashing. We find that firms exposed to greater 
scrutiny, i.e. effective supervision under institutional investors, are less likely to engage in 
ESG greenwashing.  
 
More pension scheme trustees, regulators, institutional investors, and sovereign funds 
have started considering environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors holistically for 
investment decisions (European Commission, 2016; The Pension Policy Institute, 2018). The 
United Nations (2006) launched its voluntary set of Principles for Responsible Investment 
which prioritizes ESG factors into investment practice. These six United Nations-supported 
principles of responsible investing provide the very first general guideline for incorporating 
ESG factors holistically into the asset selection process. The Pension Policy Institute (2018) 
in the UK proposes that pension funds who do not incorporate ESG factors into their 
investment strategies are more likely to deliver poor long-term returns because of the future 
economic consequences of increased regulations. Institutional investors have started using 
ESG data disclosed by firms to evaluate their investment risks and opportunities. For 




example, the €1.17 trillion Japan's Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), the biggest 
pool of retirement savings in the world, has begun allocating capital to ESG indices, such as 
the FTSE Blossom Japan Index. Presenting at 2018 FTSE Russell conference, Mr. Mizuno 
(2018), GPIF’s chief investment officer, suggests that the fund which currently holds 1% of 
global equity market capitalization, must aim for creating a sustainable capital market rather 
than trying to beat it. Another illustration of how investors can place pressure and incentivize 
firms to put ESG factors into management practice is Norges Bank Investment Management 
(NBIM), the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund. The three key investment criteria recently 
set by NBIM cover three areas: water, children's rights and climate change (Serafeim and 
Grewal, 2017). With regard to the sustainable and responsible investment practice, EY (2014) 
argues that corporate social responsibility information can provide institutional investors with 
additional information about their portfolio firms’ future benefits and risks (EY, 2014). For 
instance, disclosure on employee accidents can help investors gauge the potential adverse 
impact on productivity per worker and shareholder profit. 
 
However, the existing challenges on firms’ disclosure on ESG data are manifold: 
unaudited ESG data, no global governing body, various behavioural issues at firm level, and 
no specific regulatory guidelines to ensure the accuracy of reported ESG data (PRI, 2015; 
Khan et al., 2017; PRI 2017; State Street Global Advisors, 2017; Schroders, 2017; Fride, 
2019). We believe that these impediments in ESG disclosure and practice may give 
companies latitude to engage in ESG greenwashing. In addition to the very first general 
guidelines of the responsible investment approach provided by the United Nations to 
incorporate ESG factors holistically into the asset selection process, the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) also develop 
and propagate sustainability accounting standards. However, for each country, stakeholder 
parties still need mandatory and voluntary ESG disclosure instruments to follow the general 
ESG disclosure guidelines proposed by the United Nations, SASB, and GRI. One good 
example of voluntary disclosure instruments is the EU’s “Non-Financial Reporting 
Directive,” although the major drawback of this voluntary disclosure instrument is that the 
EU directive lacks a consistent standard for firms to follow in reporting their ESG 
information. Other recent voluntary instruments in the arena of impact investing are the 
development of Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS), a system for assessing 
the social and environmental impact of companies, and Global Impact Investment Rating 




System (GIIRS), a fund impact ratings framework. With regards to mandatory disclosure 
instruments which transfer the new disclosure rules into national law, a recent example is the 
requirement for UK pension fund trustees to produce a Statement of Investment Principles on 
how they take account of ESG considerations from October 2019 (the UK Law Commission, 
2014 and 2017; the Department for Work and Pensions DWP, 2018). In practice, firms are 
allowed to disclose favourite data or even opt-out entirely because not all ESG disclosure 
instruments are mandatory. The quality and content of ESG reports vary considerably 
(Prakash and Potoski, 2012; Siew, 2015; Büyükőzkan and Karabulut, 2018). It is also 
difficult for relevant stakeholder parties to directly evaluate firms’ transparency, 
performance, and corporate accountability in ESG aspects. The stakeholder parties rely 
heavily on corporations’ signals, which do not always convey their real performance in ESG 
dimensions accurately (Bromley and Powell, 2012; Marquis et al., 2016; Van Halderen et al., 
2016). The reliance on firms’ self-reported ESG data can also give rise to firms’ 
greenwashing behavior.  
 
In this study, we define “greenwashers” as companies which seem very transparent 
and publish large quantities of ESG data but perform poorly in ESG aspects. We view the 
three dimensions of ESG holistically and define greenwashing as deceptive disclosure in all 
three dimensions of ESG. Presumably, firms which adopt greenwashing as their corporate 
strategy attempt to obscure their less impressive overall ESG performance by disclosing large 
quantities of ESG data to mislead their stakeholders. We create peer-relative ESG 
greenwashing scores for all our sample firms by comparing their relative position for the 
Bloomberg ESG disclosure score (a measure of the quantity of disclosure) with that for the 
Asset4 ESG score (a measure of ESG performance). When a firm has a much better relative 
position than its peers in its ESG disclosure score than in its ESG performance score, this 
firm’s greenwashing score will be positive, implying that this firm is obscuring its poor ESG 
performance by simply revealing large quantities of ESG data. In the prior literature, scholars 
(Tamimi and Sebastianelli, 2017; Yu et al., 2018) employ the Bloomberg ESG disclosure 
score to measure firms’ ESG transparency, while the Asset4 ESG performance score is often 
adopted to represent firms’ real performance in ESG dimensions ((Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2012; Cheng et al., 2014; Hartmann and Uhlenbruck, 2015; Rees and Rodionova, 2015; Del 
Bosco and Misani, 2016). In this study, we aim to generate a peer-relative greenwashing 
score for our sample firms by combining these two indicators.  





Lastly, we study the common characteristics of greenwashing firms and then suggest 
ways to attenuate firms’ greenwashing behavior. We develop our hypotheses on common 
characteristics of greenwashing firms based on the prior greenwashing literature, in 
particular, whether increased scrutiny can have a direct effect on greenwashing. Our 
empirical findings show that pressure on preventing such ESG greenwashing behavior can be 
enhanced by the following four mechanisms: (a) more independent directors, (b) more 
institutional investors, (c) more-influential public interests via a less corrupted country 
system, and (d) cross-listed status, the first two being the most efficient actors for attenuating 
greenwashing. For example, our result shows that residents in a less corrupted country can 
scrutinize firms’ greenwashing behavior better since they can speak up about greenwashing. 
Overall, our empirical findings support the view that firms exposed to greater scrutiny are 
less likely to be involved in greenwashing. Our results have significant implications for ESG 
policymakers and investors by showing how firm- and country-level factors can dissuade 
greenwashing behavior.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We provide a brief overview of the 
prior literature on various types of greenwashing and develop our hypotheses on the common 
features of firms engaged in greenwashing. Next, we describe the calculation of the relative 
greenwashing score, as well as our data collection and estimation methodology. In the final 
section, we conclude, discussing the possible policy implications, limitations of this study, 
and providing suggestions for future research.    
 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
2.1 Prior literature on greenwashing 
 
In this section, we provide a brief review of how scholars from various research fields define 
greenwashing and its impact.  





Recent research argues that environmental, social and governance factors are essential 
to firm valuation and risk management (Lyon et al., 2013; Marquis et al., 2016; Huang et al., 
2018; Yu et al., 2018). In particular, there are several prior studies focusing on voluntary 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility issues. For instance, Lu et al. (2017) show that 
standalone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports can enhance monitoring over firm 
managers and thus induce them to make better investment decisions, resulting in more 
efficient use of cash holdings. By investigating the first-time standalone CSR reports issued 
by U.S. firms, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence indicating that companies 
with better peer-relative CSR performance can access equity capital more cheaply after they 
initiate voluntary disclosure of CSR issues. Ghoul et al. (2018) find for manufacturing firms 
across 30 countries that corporate environmental responsibility can reduce firms’ risk 
exposure and consequently lower their cost of equity capital.   
 
 Although the literature shows that environmental, social and governance factors can 
have an impact on firm valuation, greenwashing is a threat to accurate ESG information. As 
suggested by Bowen and Aragon-Correa (2014) and Du (2014), greenwashing is a deliberate 
information disclosure decision initiated by firms that may be beneficial to firms but costly to 
society. From the perspective of corporate sustainability disclosure, Herbohn, Walker, &Loo 
(2014) find that, in a sample of energy and mining companies, corporate sustainability 
performance is positively related to sustainability disclosure. Pascual et al. (2017) study 
whether corporate environmental actions can help firms get social acceptance. Investigating 
US-listed firms in polluting industries from 1997 to 2001, they find that intense scrutiny from 
nongovernmental organizations is detrimental to a firm in achieving social acceptance if its 
environmental performance deteriorates. In the field of environmental disclosure, some 
previous studies (Bromley and Powell, 2012; Kirk and Vincent, 2014; Marquis et al., 2016) 
document that organizations often set out symbolic compliance rather than actual. For 
instance, some researchers (Berliner and Prakash, 2015; Shvarts et al., 2018) observe that the 
members of the UN Global Compact (UNGC) are sometimes inclined to downplay their 
commitments without improving their environmental practice although they enjoy the 
reputation of being green as being part of UNGC. Marquis et al. (2016) also propose that 




firms with better environmental performance might greenwash less since they have less to 
hide.  
 
We identify three types of greenwashing discussed in the literature. The first type of 
greenwashing is manipulating disclosure to boost company valuation. By doing so, 
companies overstate their real environmental performance, which is so-called a 
“greenwashing” strategy” (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Lyon and Montgomery, 2013; Marquis 
et al., 2016).  Firms adopting “greenwashing” as their corporate strategy try to obscure their 
poor environmental performance by disclosing large quantities of environmental data to 
mislead their stakeholders. For example, Radu and Francoeur (2017) document that a firm’s 
environmental performance is positively associated with its environmental disclosure. On the 
other hand, studying U.S. electric utility firms’ data, Kim and Lyon (2015) suggest that firms 
may choose to have communications that understate their environmental achievements, 
which is so-called a “brownwashing” strategy and also in line with previous research 
proposing that green credentials or social responsibility programs are detrimental to share 
prices (Ullmann, 1985; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn, 2011).  
 
The second type of greenwashing is selective disclosure to mislead investors. Some 
researchers (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Lyon et al. 2013; Marquis et al. 2016) define 
greenwashing as firms selectively reporting positive environmental information but hiding 
negative information. In other circumstances, Kirk and Vincent (2014) document how 
companies disclose private information to a selected group of investors only. Consequently, 
these firms are able to create a false impression to mislead the public about their actual 
environmental performance. However, Marquis et al. (2016) state that corporations are less 
likely to undertake selective disclosure where they are more exposed to global norms and 
scrutiny.  
 
Finally, the third type of greenwashing simply focuses on product-level greenwashing 
rather than firm-level greenwashing (Delmas and Burbano, 2011; Majid and Russell, 2015; 
Testa et al., 2015; Cho and Baskin, 2018). For example, Testa et al. (2015) investigate 
whether the use of eco-labels can influence Italian consumers’ purchasing decisions. Delmas 




and Burbano (2011) show that firms can overstate the environmental benefits of a product to 
increase sales. Majid and Russell (2015) find that second-hand cars of pure green brands such 
as Toyota Prius lose value more slowly than their counterparts with green brand extensions.  
 
In this paper, we aim to extend the theory of greenwashing by examining firms’ 
greenwashing behavior in the three dimensions of ESG holistically. This is the main 
difference between our approach and the various definitions of greenwashing in the literature 
since previous studies only focus on assessing the greenwashing issue for each dimension of 
environmental, social, or governance separately. In this study, we “re-define” greenwashing 
as firms obscuring their less impressive overall ESG performance by revealing large 
quantities of ESG data to manage relevant stakeholders’ impression. We focus on ESG data 
disclosure at the firm-level. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis development on common characteristics of ESG greenwashers 
 
We aim to gain a better understanding of the factors which can mitigate greenwashing 
behavior. The prior literature on environmental greenwashing and empirical evidence support 
that closer scrutiny by external stakeholders can alleviate the extent of environmental 
greenwashing (Kim and Lyon, 2011; Lyon and Mongomery, 2013; Delmas and Burbano, 
2011; Kim and Lyon, 2015). For example, Kim and Lyon (2011) find that companies are less 
likely to be involved in environmental greenwashing when they were headquartered in a 
location with a greater density of environmental NGO members. Lyon and Montgomery 
(2013) also argue that such environmental greenwashing behavior can be deterred by external 
scrutiny from environmental activists.  
 
Based on this literature, we focus on whether increased scrutiny can have a direct 
effect on firms’ greenwashing behavior. In this paper, we hypothesize that companies are less 
likely to engage in ESG greenwashing because of their exposure to pressure arising from a 
variety of stakeholders.  





Firm-level governance factors  
At firm level, we focus on whether increased scrutiny from independent directors, 
institutional investors, or board size has a direct effect on firms’ greenwashing behavior. The 
CSR literature suggests that CSR disclosure can be seen as firms trying to meet the extra 
information demand from non-shareholder stakeholders and shareholders (Dhaliwal et al., 
2011; Kim et al., 2012; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Lu etal, 2017). For instance, Dhaliwal et al. 
(2012) show that a corporate social responsibility report can exert a positive impact on 
analysts’ forecast accuracy. Researchers (Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Lee et al., 2008; 
Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Liu et al., 2015; Ferrell et al., 2016) also document that 
effective governance mechanisms, including independent board directors and an institutional 
investor base, may reduce the agency costs linked to the division of ownership and control. 
Dalla Via and Perego (2018) suggest that firms with stronger corporate governance systems 
have higher levels of conflict minerals disclosure as mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Consistent with the view from prior CSR literature (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 
2012), the rationale of our first hypothesis is that the environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) data disclosed in firms’ sustainability reports can provide additional information 
beyond conventional annual reports, which is beneficial for decision making for all relevant 
stakeholders. Consequently, we argue that ESG data as a whole can reduce relevant parties’ 
information asymmetry and thus reduce firm managers’ opportunities to engage in 
greenwashing by enhanced monitoring and increased scrutiny from all relevant stakeholders. 
Prior studies examine whether increased scrutiny can reduce firms’ greenwashing behaviour 
in environmental, social, or governance issues separately. For example, Cuadrado-Ballesteros 
et al. (2015) document that a higher percentage of independent directors exerts a positive 
influence on the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) information disclosure. 
Abrahamson and Park (1994) show that firms are more likely to disclose adverse financial 
information if they are thoroughly monitored by their investors and boards. Furthermore, 
Marquis et al. (2016) document that greater scrutiny and global norms can discourage 
environmentally damaging firms from selective disclosure. Adams and Mehran (2012) 
provide evidence that increases in board size is likely to add value when the complexity of 
bank holding companies increases. Studying Canadian firms, Ben-amar and Mcllkenny 
(2015) show that a firm’s board effectiveness is positively related to its carbon disclosure 
quality. However, we also observe some conflict findings against the positive impact on 




environmental disclosure from increased scrutiny. For example, Kim and Lyon (2015) and 
Lyon et al. (2013) argue that shareholders are likely to place pressure on the companies they 
invest in to avoid disclosing more environmental information since these environmental 
practices could raise a firm’s costs and consequently have a negative impact on its share 
price.  
 
Given the evidence from the literature that increased scrutiny can have a direct effect 
on firms’ greenwashing behavior, we propose to include three corporate ownership and 
governance variables in our model, as stated in Hypothesis 1.  
 
Hypothesis 1: (a) An increased share of institutional owners reduces firms’ ESG 
greenwashing behavior (b) An increased share of independent directors reduces firms’ ESG 
greenwashing behavior (c) A greater board size reduces firms’ ESG greenwashing behavior, 




In this section, we argue that more scrutiny and pressure from the public can also lead to 
more reliable corporate disclosure in ESG issues. Prior studies suggest that firms’ 
greenwashing is also influenced by the extent to which their headquarter’s country scrutinizes 
corporate behavior. Scholars (Vormedal and Rund, 2009; Marquis et al., 2016) document 
how the institutional environment can impact on corporate decisions and the relevant 
empirical evidence supports this notion. For instance, some previous studies (Marquis and 
Qian, 2014; Marquis et al., 2016) find that companies publish their environmental and CSR 
reports more frequently when they are headquartered in countries with a greater density of 
environmental NGO members or when they are monitored by regulating authorities. Delmas 
and Toffel (2004) also show that firms adopt different types of environmental strategy in 
order to response to institutional pressures. Given the evidence from previous studies, we 
examine whether the absence of corruption and the absenceof political rights affect firms’ 
greenwashing behavior. We focus on whether these two country-level factors can increase a 




company’s exposure to scrutiny and consequently influence its greenwashing behavior. Prior 
literature (Cooper et al.,2010; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006) reports that inhabitants in a society 
with weaker political rights are less likely to express their concerns through the media or 
NGOs freely, and corruption influences the cost of improving firm’s transparency through 
activities such as bribery. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) document that Japanese firms are 
under less pressure to enhance corporate social responsibility because corruption is less 
prevalent in Germany than Japan. Accordingly, this leads to our Hypothesis 2. We expect that 
firms will be dissuaded from greenwashing in countries with less corruption and more 
political rights. The rationale for this relationship is that more scrutiny and pressure from the 
public can lead to more reliable corporate disclosure of ESG issues.   
 
Hypothesis 2: (a) Firms will engage in less ESG greenwashing behavior in countries where 
corruption is low. (b) Firms will engage in more ESG greenwashing behavior in countries 




We also study whether cross-listed firms are scrutinized more closely when their shares are 
listed on external stock exchanges. Cross-listing means that a company has its shares listed 
on at least one international stock exchange in addition to its home country. Such cross-listed 
companies must adhere to their home country securities regulations and the listing 
requirements of the host countries in which they are cross-listed. Consequently, cross-listed 
firms may have less incentive to greenwash in ESG issues and try to avoid irritating external 
stakeholders. We predict that the state of cross-listing can dissuade firms from engaging in 
ESG greenwashing because international exposure tends to increase scrutiny on the firm and 
consequently influence its responsiveness to its foreign regulators and overseas investors. 
 
Our assumption leads to Hypothesis 3. We predict that heightened transparency 
standards are more likely to discourage cross-listed firms from greenwashing behavior. 





Hypothesis 3: Cross-listed firms are less likely to engage in ESG greenwashing.  




3. Research design  
 
Having surveyed the various types of greenwashing and developed the hypotheses used in 
our investigation, we now describe our research design. Firstly, we create the peer-relative 
greenwashing score, which measures the extent to which a firm engages in ESG 
greenwashing. Then, we develop a model for examining the common characteristics of firms 
that exhibit greenwashing behavior.  
 
3.1 Peer-relative greenwashing score 
 
Earlier in the paper, we define “greenwashers” as firms which seek to create a very 
transparent public image by revealing large quantities of ESG data but perform poorly in 
ESG aspects. To align with our definition of greenwashing in this study, we estimate a firm’s 
peer-relative greenwashing score using equation 1. This peer-relative greenwashing score can 
be used to quantify the magnitude of a firm’s greenwashing behavior in ESG issues. 
 
A firm’s peer-relative greenwashing score = (a normalized measure representing a firm’s 
relative position to its peers in the distribution of the Bloomberg ESG 
disclosure score) - (a normalized measure representing a firm’s relative 
position to its peers in the distribution of our modified Asset4 ESG 
performance score)       
Eq (1) 
 
To measure a firm’s ESG disclosure, we use the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score by 
following the previous studies (Tamimi and Sebastianelli, 2017; Yu et al. 2018). The 
Bloomberg ESG disclosure score reflects the quantity of ESG data this firm discloses to the 
public but does not gauge its ESG performance. All ESG information disclosed by a firm is 
counted irrespective of whether it is favorable or negative. The Bloomberg disclosure score is 
a proprietary calculation. More than 900 key disclosure indicators (e.g., direct CO2 




emissions, total energy consumptions, total water use, hazardous waste, percentages of 
minorities in workforce, workforce accidents, board meeting attendance, and political 
donations) are structured into separate disclosure score for each dimension, and then combine 
as the total Bloomberg ESG disclosure score for each firm. Starting at 0.1 for firms that 
disclose a minimum amount of ESG data, the score can reach 100 for those that disclose 
information on every ESG data point gathered by Bloomberg. The higher the Bloomberg 
ESG disclosure score, the more non-financial information is disclosed. More detailed 
information on the Bloomberg disclosure score matrix is provided in Appendix Table A-1.  
 
To represent firms’ performance on ESG dimensions, we employ the three pillar 
scores from Asset4 on the environmental, social, and governance dimensions. Scholars adopt 
the Asset4 ESG performance scores as an indicator of a firm’s performance on 
environmental, social and governance dimensions (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Cheng et al., 
2014; Hartmann and Uhlenbruck, 2015; Rees and Rodionova, 2015; Del Bosco and Misani, 
2016). Thomson Reuters supplies the Asset4 performance scores based on the relative 
performance of a company on the aspects of E, S, and G, compared with the Asset4 universe. 
As stated by Thomson Reuters (2019), the key metrics cover all aspects of ESG, from 
emission reduction to employment quality (see Appendix Table A-1). The ESG performance 
scores range between 0 and 100 where higher values represent better performance. However, 
in order to have a meaningful comparison between the disclosure score and performance 
scores, we re-weight the performance scores using the weighting scheme for the disclosure 
scores. By doing so, the weights of the three components of E, S, and G are consistent for our 
measures of ESG disclosure and ESG performance. 
 
We convert both scores into ratios by dividing by 100, so the maximum value for both 
indicators is one. Then we normalize both scores to the same scale by subtracting the mean 
and dividing by the standard deviation. A company’s peer-relative greenwashing score is the 
difference between its normalized ESG disclosure and its normalized ESG transparency 
score. If a firm discloses no indicators for either or both types of scores, we treat this situation 
as missing data for the relative greenwashing score.  
 




We can identify three basic circumstances of a firm’s ESG disclosure using equation 
(1). Firms can either (a) disclose large quantities of ESG data such that it overstates its 
achievements in ESG issues, (b) disclose its ESG information fully, so the disclosed 
information is the same as the reflection of its actual performance in ESG issues, or (c) 
disclose less ESG information or remain silent so it understates its achievements in ESG 
issues. For example, when a firm has a much better relative position than its peers in its ESG 
disclosure score than in its ESG performance score, this company’s greenwashing score will 
be positive, implying that the company is greenwashing. It may be hiding its poor 
performance in its ESG issues by simply revealing large quantities of ESG data.  Oppositely, 
firms with negative greenwashing scores choose to understate their environmental 
achievements, which may in line with prior research suggesting that green credentials and 
social responsibility programs are harmful to share prices (Ullmann, 1985; Khanna and 




We summarise our theoretical model below. The dependent variable in equation (2) is our 
peer-relative greenwashing score, which quantifies the magnitude of a firm’s ESG 
greenwashing. Employing the panel dataset, we examine the common features of firms’ 
greenwashing behavior across sample firms from all countries.  
 
𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 − 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑡
= 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 ∗ (𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠)𝑗𝑡 + 𝑏2
∗ ( 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠)𝑗𝑡 + 𝑏3 ∗ (𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑗𝑡 + 𝑏4
∗ (𝑅&𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑗𝑡 + 𝑏5
∗ (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟)𝑗𝑡 + 𝑏6
∗ log(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑗𝑡 + 𝑏7 ∗ (𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑗𝑡 + 𝑏8
∗ (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑗𝑡 + 𝑏 9
∗ (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)𝑗𝑡 + 𝑏10
∗ log(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑘𝑡 
    
                                                                                                                                Eq (2) 






𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑟 − 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑡: A peer-relative greenwashing score for 
company j of country k in year t, which measures the magnitude of a firms’ 
greenwashing behavior in ESG dimensions.  
A vector of firm-level governance factors, including (a) share of institutional owners 
(b) share of independent directors, and (c) log (board size)   
A vector of country factors, including (a) the lack of corruption, and (b) the absence 
of political rights.  
Cross-listing: The status of cross-listing equals one if a firm has its shares listed on 
at least one external stock exchanges, and zero otherwise.  
A vector of control variables, including:  
(a) Operating firm performance indicators: We adopt return on asset (ROA), and 
the average return on asset for the last three years (ROA3Y), and the average return 
on asset for the last five years (ROA5Y).   
(b) Log (asset firm size): Firm size is measured by the book value of assets. 
(c) Liquidity: We employ the quick ratio and the current ratio. 
(d) Leverage: We measure a firm’s leverage as the debt/total asset ratio. 
(e) R&D intensity: We define R&D intensity as the sum of R&D costs divided by 
sales for the prior three years. 
(f) Log (GDP per capita): The value of GDP per capita converted to U.S. dollar at 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. As a robustness check, we also re-
estimate this equation by replacing Log (GDP per capita) with the Human 
Development Index. The Human Development Index, attempting to capture overall 
national well-being, is published by the United Nations.   
 
 
We also include a set of control variables to reflect important dimensions of the firm- 
and country-level factors that may affect firms’ greenwashing behavior. For instance, Delmas 
& Burbano (2011) document that firm characteristics such as profitability and size may also 
influence environmental greenwashing behavior. Prior literature (Himmelberg et al., 1999; 
Lee et al. 2008) suggests that R&D intensity is positively related to agency cost, we thus 
employ the variable of R&D intensity to measure a firm’s agency and monitoring cost. We 
control for firm size since large firms typically have a cheaper cost of capital for 
environmental investments because of better access to capital markets (Innes and Sam, 2008; 
Herbohn et al., 2014). We also include GDP per capita, converted to U.S. dollar at PPP 
exchange rates, to capture the impact from a country’s economic development. Some scholars 




(De Soto, 1989; Husted, 2005) document that economic development is an important force 
for environmental sustainability. For example, Gnyawali (1996) finds that people in advanced 
economies are better informed and therefore demand environmentally and socially 
responsible conduct from companies. However, others have different views. Previous studies 
(Chapple and Moon, 2005; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) show that the stage of economic 




4. Data Sources and Results 
 
4.1 Data Sources 
 
Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we select our sample firms from the MSCI All Country World Index, 
which accounts for around 85% of the market capitalization of the worldwide equity 
opportunity set. We exclude firms headquartered in tax havens such as Jersey and Bermuda 
because their inclusion may confound the impact of country factors. This results in an 
international dataset which comprises 1925 large-cap companies headquartered in 47 
countries and territories over the period 2012-2016. We drop financial firms from our study 
because financial and banking regulations may influence firms’ ESG disclosure and their 
greenwashing behavior. 
 
We obtain other country data from a variety of sources. The GDP per capita in U.S. 
dollar at PPP exchange rates is collected from the International Monetary Fund’s World 
Economic Outlook Database. We adopt this measure to compare the state of economic 
development across countries. We also use the annual “absence of corruption index” from 
Transparency International, which ranges from zero for highly corrupt countries to 100 for 
highly clean countries. For example, Denmark (90.8) is the "cleanest" country, while 




corruption is high in Russia (28.2) and followed by India (37.6). Transparency International 
(2017) reports that many countries in Asia Pacific, including India, fail to stop corruption and 
900 million people pay bribes. Conversely, the high score for Denmark reflects surveys of 
citizens’ and companies’ experience with low rates of reported bribery. We employ the 
indicator for the “lack of political rights” from the World Report of Freedom House for the 
sample period of 2012-2016. For “lack of political rights,” each country is rated on a scale 
from 1 to 7, where a low number indicates a high level of political rights. We collect data on 
firm-level characteristics and control variables from Bloomberg and Datastream. We find that 
approximately 1450 companies had their shares cross-listed in at least one of the sample 
years.  
 
We report descriptive statistics for all variables in Table 1, along with the correlations 
between each of them. Most correlations are relatively low. To avoid the multicollinearity 
problem, highly correlated variables are not used simultaneously in equation (2).   
 
[Insert Table 1]  
 
4.2 Empirical results 
 
We report and interpret our empirical results concerning the common characteristics of large-
cap corporations’ greenwashing behavior.  
 
4.2.1 Peer-relative greenwashing score 
 
Appendix Table A-2 provides our sample distribution across countries and territories. Then in 
Figure 1, we explore the relation between ESG performance scores and ESG disclosure 
scores by countries. We group our sample firms by country and present their ESG 
performance scores on the vertical axis and ESG disclosure scores on the horizontal axis. We 




find ESG performance scores are positively associated with ESG disclosure scores. Our 
observation is consistent with the empirical finding of Herbohn et al. (2014) showing a 
positive performance-disclosure relation in the dimension of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR).  
 
[Insert Table A-2]  
[Insert Figure 1]  
  
We also suggest that companies in the countries below the regression line may be more likely 
to engage in greenwashing along ESG dimensions. For instance, Japan and South Korea have 
better ESG disclosure score than other sample countries, but both suffer from an inferior ESG 
performance score, especially in the governance dimension. According to the Asset4 
database, Japan receives an average governance performance score of 11 out of the maximum 
value as 100, followed by South Korea (13), while the average “governance” performance 
score for all our sample firms is 51. As stated by Thomson Reuters (2019), the corporate 
governance score provided by Asset4 reflects “a firm’s systems and processes, which ensure 
that its executives and board members work in the best interests of its long-term 
shareholders.” 
 
Furthermore, we present a boxplot of ESG disclosure score and ESG performance 
score for the 1925 sample firms in Figure 2. This figure shows the distributions of our ESG 
disclosure scores and ESG performance score. The average of the ESG performance score is 
58 (median = 60), while the average of ESG disclosure score is 33 (median = 33). As shown 
in Figure 2, we can see that the distributions of ESG disclosure score and ESG performance 
scores vary significantly. Therefore, we have to normalize both types of scores before we use 
equation (1) to calculate peer-relative greenwashing scores for our sample firms. 
 
[Insert Figure 2]  
 




That is, we compute:    
 
A normalized measure of Bloomberg ESG disclosure score= 
(𝐷𝑗𝑘𝑡−?̅?)
𝜎𝐷
   
                                                                                                                                   Eq (3) 
 
 




                                                                                                                                    Eq (4) 
 
where: Our measures are normalized by the standard deviations of ESG disclosure scores 
(𝜎𝐷) and ESG performance scores (𝜎𝑃). ?̅? represents the average value of ESG disclosure 
scores, and ?̅? indicates the average value of ESG performance scores.  
 
Finally, we show the distribution of peer-relative greenwashing scores in Figure 3. 
Although many large-cap firms overstate their achievements in ESG dimensions 
(greenwashing strategy), some firms understate their achievements (brownwashing strategy). 
The mean of the peer-relative greenwashing score of our sample firms is 0.04, and the 
median is 0.059. 
 
[Insert Figure 3]  
 
Table 2 reports peer-relative greenwashing scores of firms in the ten Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) sectors, excluding the financial sector. We find that 
companies in the Materials have the highest peer-relative greenwashing score of 0.1522, 
followed by Energy (0.1477), and Utilities (0.1202). Our finding implies that the sample 
firms in the Materials sector are more likely to engage in ESG greenwashing. As we can see 
from Table 2, peer-relative greenwashing scores are highly industry-dependent. Therefore, 
we use an industry-adjusted measure of greenwashing score as our dependent variable in our 




regression of Eq (1). The greenwashing score for a company is industry-adjusted by 
subtracting the average greenwashing score of the sector that the company belongs to.   
 
[Insert Table 2]  
 
4.2.2 Results on greenwashers’ common characteristics 
 
We now turn to examine the common characteristics of companies that engage in 
greenwashing.   
 
Firm-level governance factors  
Table 3 shows results using the estimation method of panel EGLS period weight and the 
White diagonal as our coefficient covariance method, which is robust to heteroskedasticity 
(Reed and Ye, 2011).  
 
[Insert Table 3]  
 
Our findings suggest that increased institutional ownership and a higher share of 
independent directors can reduce firms’ greenwashing behavior. Both factors, “percentage of 
institutional ownership” and “percentage of independent directors,” are consistently 
significant at the 1% level (refer to Model (1) to Model (8) in Table 3). For example, based 
on Model (7) shown in Table 4, a 1% increase in the share of independent directors leads to 
0.85% less greenwashing along ESG dimensions. Moreover, the effect of 1% increase in 
institutional ownership reduces greenwashing by 0.36%. However, we find that a greater 
board size has no significant impact on firms’ greenwashing behavior. The insignificant 
impact of board size on firm’s greenwashing behaviour could be due to the benefits of having 
more directors outweighed by the increased costs of a larger board. Prior literature on board 




size (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Guest, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012) suggests that a 
larger board size can increase a board’s ability to monitor managerial behaviour, but a larger 
board is also likely to suffer from free-riding, coordination problem among group decision 
makers, and slower decision making. For example, Jensen (1993) shows that boards beyond 
eight members are less likely to function effectively, while we observe that the average board 
number in our study is between ten to eleven.      
Our empirical evidence shows that increased scrutiny from independent directors and 
institutional investors have a direct effect on firms’ greenwashing behavior. The findings 
match our prior expectation that firms are less likely to engage in ESG greenwashing when 
relevant stakeholders exert greater scrutiny over the relationship between a company’s ESG 
performance and its ESG transparency. Our regression results also offer support for the view 
that some of these governance mechanisms are potential substitutes for each other (Dahya 
and McConnell, 2007; Bebchuk and Weisback, 2010; Liu et al., 2015; Palmberg, 2015). In 
our case, oversight from independent directors and institutional investors can complement 
each other to deter large-cap firms from engaging in ESG greenwashing.  
 
To provide further support for our hypotheses, we also perform a set of robustness 
checks for equation (2) using various operational firm performance indicators. We use an 
alternative measure of firm performance by replacing ROA (return on asset) with three-year 
average return on asset (ROA3Y) and five-year average return on asset (ROA5Y). We also 
employ the quick ratio to replace the current ratio as a measure of a firm’s liquidity. The 
regression results are shown in Table 4 and Table 5, which are consistent with those 
presented in Table 3. Both firm-level factors, independent directors, and institutional 
investors, still matter, whereas the size of the board does not reduce a firms’ greenwashing 
behavior. These supplementary regression results give us additional confidence that we 
capture the hypothesized effects robustly.   
 
[Insert Table 4]  
[Insert Table 5]  
 





We find support for part (a) of Hypothesis 2, which posits that the absence of corruption is 
likely to reduce firms’ greenwashing behavior. Consistent with our argument, the coefficients 
for the absence of corruption are statistically significant and negative in all model 
specifications in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Controlling for per-capita GDP, we show that companies 
in countries with less corruption are less likely to engage in greenwashing behavior. More 
specifically, based on Model (7) in Table 5, a 1% increase in the factor of the absence of 
corruption (this means a country will become less corrupted) leads to 0.60% less 
greenwashing. Our result suggests that, in a less-corrupted country, inhabitants can scrutinize 
firms’ greenwashing behavior more and speak up about this issue. Therefore, we suggest that 
a less corrupted system can provide more opportunities for relevant stakeholder parties to 
lessen the extent of greenwashing.   
 
Surprisingly, the coefficients of “lack of political rights” are negative and consistently 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Refer to all model specifications shown in Tables 3, 4, 
and 5. This finding contradicts the notion that substantial political rights empower people to 
discourage firms’ greenwashing behavior. This empirical finding might be explained by the 
following mechanisms. People in a society with a stronger political rights are given more 
opportunities to express their concerns through the media, influential environmental 
organizations, and NGOs. Meanwhile, large-cap firms also have more political rights to 
selectively disclose their favorable environmental credentials, improving the opinion of 
stakeholders through activities such as (a) lobbying efforts to the government, (b) seeking the 
legitimacy of corporate green branding, or (c) to averting mandatory regulations by 
developing voluntary self-regulation (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2010). Our findings are in 
line with previous studies (Bansal & Kistruck, 2006; Van Halderen et al., 2016), which show 
that organizations can obtain financial rewards and legitimacy by taking symbolic actions 
without implementing the practices.  
 
Our results suggest that economic development, as measured by per-capita GDP, plays an 
ambiguous role in firms’ greenwashing behavior in ESG dimensions. See all model 
specifications shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Our finding matches prior studies (Chapple and 




Moon, 2005; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) which suggest that economic development cannot 
fully explain the variation in cross-country corporate social performance. As a robustness 
check, we replace Log (GDP per capita) with the Human Development Index in Equation (2). 
The Human Development Index, provided by the United Nations (2019), is a combined 
measurement of educational attainment, GDP per capita, and life expectancy. By adopting the 
Human Development Index, we control for overall national well-being holistically. We 
display all our regressions relevant to the Human Development Index in Appendix Tables A-
3, A-4, and A-5. We confirm that the main results shown in Tables 3-6 are robust to the 
inclusion of these additional regressors. Interestingly, we find that higher national well-being 
can reduce firms’ greenwashing behavior.  
 
Cross-listing 
Our findings support Hypothesis 3.  In most circumstances, cross-listed firms must meet 
stricter disclosure requirements, which tend to lessen information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent. Consequently, cross-listed firms have less incentive to engage in 
greenwashing. The empirical result meets our prediction as the cross-listing coefficient is 
negative and significant at the 1% level across all our model specifications. See Model (3) to 
Model (8) shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Our findings support the notion that cross-listed firms 
are more likely to be dissuaded from greenwashing and more willing to portray a full and 
proper picture of their real performance in ESG issues. This occurs through stricter 
international disclosure requirements in the host country and scrutiny from foreign investors. 
 
4.2.3 Relative importance of company characteristics, cross-listing, and country factors 
 
Focusing on the relative importance among these factors, we show our regression results in 
Table 6. Our findings indicate that a firm’s firm-level factors exert a more significant 
influence on firms’ greenwashing behavior, followed by country-level factors, and finally 
cross-listing. 
 




[Insert Table 6]  
 
For instance, we examine firm characteristics only in Model (1) of Table 6. On the 
other hand, we include only country factors while excluding all firm features in Models (2) 
and (3) of Table 6. Comparing Model (1) and Model (2), we find that firm characteristics 
account for 17.54% of the total variation of the relative greenwashing score, 3.16 times as 
much as country factors. We obtain a similar result for cross-listing. Comparing Model (1) 
and Model (7), our results show that company characteristics account of the total variation in 
the greenwashing relative score 4.13 times as much as cross-listing. We also find that the 
influence from the country-level factors on greenwashing relative score is only slightly higher 
than the impact from cross-listing (see Model 4 vs. Model 5). Finally, we include all firm 
characteristics, country-level factors, and cross-listing status from Models (8) to (12) in Table 






We investigate large-cap firms’ greenwashing behavior in ESG issues. Viewing these three 
dimensions of environmental, social and governance as a whole and incorporating these ESG 
factors into the asset selection process distinguishes the responsible investing from the ethical 
investment approach. The key characteristic of the responsible investing is that investors do 
not have to exclude companies and can still go for maximization of their return as long as 
they consider their risks posed by environmental, social and governance factors. Therefore, to 
understand greenwashing is increasingly important, given rising demands for companies to 
perform better in ESG dimensions and provide more reliable ESG data to supplement their 
financial reports. The current challenges of ESG data disclosure are that sustainability reports 
are unaudited ESG, there is lack of standardization in disclosure rules of ESG data and no 
global governing body to ensure the accuracy of reported ESG information. We emphasize 
the importance of aligning a firm’s ESG transparency (symbolic) and its ESG performance 
(action) since greenwashing can be a barrier for investors to integrate ESG data into their 




investment strategy. In this study, we aim to identify some ways to lessen firms’ 
greenwashing behavior. We make the following contributions. Firstly, the prior literature 
concentrates on greenwashing behavior for each environmental, social and governance 
dimension. In this study, we extend the theory of greenwashing to incorporate the three 
dimensions of ESG holistically. Secondly, we create peer-relative greenwashing scores for 
our sample firms by comparing a company’s relative position in the distribution of the 
Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores and our modified Asset4 ESG performance scores. By 
doing so, we identify the large-cap firms that are engaged in greenwashing and quantify the 
degree to which a company is considered to engage in greenwashing. Finally, our model 
unpacks whether firm-level features, country-level characteristics, and cross-listing status can 
dissuade firms from engaging in greenwashing. We test our hypotheses by employing a 
global dataset comprised of 1925 companies. The variation across countries helps us to 
specify the impacts of cross-listing, country features, and firm characteristic on greenwashing 
behavior. We find that companies engage less in ESG greenwashing when relevant 
stakeholders exert greater scrutiny over the link between ESG transparency and ESG 
performance. Our results suggest that pressure on preventing such ESG greenwashing 
behavior can be enhanced by the following four factors: (a) more independent directors (b) 
more institutional investors (c) more influential public interests through a less corrupted 
country system, and (d) the state of cross-listing. In particular, two firm-level governance 
factors are the most two effective factors to attenuate firms’ greenwashing behavior. Our 
results provide empirical support for stewardship, an effective and responsible active 
ownership, since firms exposed to greater scrutiny are less likely to be involved in 
greenwashing.       
 
Overall, we contribute to research on sustainability in capital markets, ESG data 
disclosure, and responsible investments. Our hypotheses and empirical findings in this study 
foster a better understanding of the varied factors that impact large-cap firms’ greenwashing 
behavior. Understanding how firm- and country-level factors can dissuade greenwashing 
behavior has important implications for all stakeholders. Based on our findings, we propose 
to focus on stewardship and encourage large-cap firms across countries to have more 
independent directors and institutional investors on the board. This study has limitations that 
are left for future research to address. We only examine large-cap firms, since smaller firms 
often struggle to integrate these ESG factors into their operations because of insufficient 




resources. Therefore, firms with smaller size may need even more support from the regulators 
and governments. However, whether smaller firms are inclined to engage in ESG 
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Table 1 Summary statistics and variable correlations                                                                                
Variable Mean SD Obs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) 0.0390 0.7882 7295 1.00                
(2) 41879.86 16220.04 9625 -0.22* 1.00               
(3) 0.6902 0.1389 9225 -0.15* 0.75* 1.00              
(4) 0.2524 0.2316 9625 0.01 -0.41* -0.59* 1.00             
(5) 0.2687 0.1845 9330 -0.03* -0.01 -0.05* 0.01 1.00            
(6) 0.0600 0.0775 9331 -0.05* 0.01 -0.04* 0.02 -0.26* 1.00           
(7) 23010.97 46215.61 9389 0.01 0.03* -0.02 0.02 0.08* -0.11* 1.00          
(8) 0.0299 0.0868 9232 0.05* -0.04* -0.10* 0.08* 0.00 0.05* -0.05* 1.00         
(9) 0.6174 0.2932 9232 -0.31* 0.29* 0.11* -0.04* 0.04* 0.09* -0.04* -0.24* 1.00        
(10) 0.0123 0.0210 9012 0.03* 0.05* 0.04* -0.04* -0.28* 0.15* -0.10* 0.01 0.05* 1.00       
(11) 0.0187 0.0290 9109 0.00 0.06* 0.05* -0.04* -0.29* 0.15* -0.12* 0.01 0.08* 0.91* 1.00      
(12) 0.1543 0.2359 8877 -0.06* 0.06* 0.01 0.04* 0.01 0.49* -0.05* 0.03* 0.11* -0.03* -0.03* 1.00     
(13) 0.1528 0.2158 8543 -0.07* 0.05* 0.03* 0.06* 0.02 0.45* -0.04* 0.03* 0.11* -0.03* -0.03* 0.91* 1.00    
(14) 10.5427 3.0929 7990 0.04* 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.15* -0.12* 0.24* -0.07* -0.04* -0.12* -0.11* -0.02 -0.02 1.00   
(15) 0.5790 0.2707 7528 -0.38* 0.44* 0.27* -0.21* 0.10* 0.04* 0.08* -0.09* 0.49* -0.05* -0.03* 0.08* 0.09* -0.10* 1.00  
(16) 0.0471 1.4300 8755 -0.03* 0.12* 0.10* -0.12* -0.20* 0.01 -0.02* -0.03* 0.11* 0.28* 0.23* -0.07* -0.08* -0.10* 0.11* 1.00 
*indicates 10% statistical significance level or better. 




Source: Authors’ calculations. This table shows the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. Note. (1) Relative greenwashing score, (2) GDP per capita 
converted to U.S. dollar at purchasing power parity exchange rates, (3) The lack of Corruption, (4) Absence of Political Rights, (5) Leverage ratio, (6) ROA (return on asset), 
(7) Asset firm size, (8) Insider ownership, (9) Institutional holdings, (10) Quick ratio, (11) Current ratio, (12) ROA3Y, (13) ROA5Y, (14) Board size, (15) Independent board 
members, (16) R&D Intensity. 
  




Table 2 Peer-relative greenwashing scores of ten GICS sectors 
GICS sector Percentage of all firms Peer-relative greenwashing scores  
 
Consumer discretionary 17.71% 0.0506 
(0.7772) 
Consumer staple 9.92% -0.0455 
(0.8417) 
Energy 6.65% 0.1477 
(0.6944) 
Healthcare 8.05% 0.0755 
(0.6962) 
Industrials 18.29% -0.0363 
(0.8189) 
Information technology 11.38% 0.0333 
(0.8214) 
Materials 10.13% 0.1522 
(0.8210) 
Real estate 7.43% 0.0508 





Telecommunication services 4.26% -0.1271 
(0.6848) 
Utilities 6.18% 0.1202 
(0.8114) 
Total (1925 firms)  100%  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. A higher value of the relative greenwashing score indicates more pronounced greenwashing behaviour. Our sample period is from 2012 to 
2016.  
  




Table 3 Regression results for Greenwashing [ROA used as an operating firm performance indicator] 
















Dependent variable  
 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
 peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
 peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
           



































































































variable: Y=1, N=0) 












           




Control variables:           










































Quick Ratio  0.8300 
(0.6371) 




   


























































  -0.0354 
(0.0416) 
 
Log (Human Development 
Index) 
      -0.5131* 
(0.2651) 




0.1946 0.1948 0.1910 0.1851  0.1992 0.1557  0.1991 0.1555 
*, ** and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  




This table shows regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses for Equation 2, where ROA is used as the operating firm performance indicator. Our 
international dataset comprises 1925 large-cap companies headquartered in 47 countries over the period 2012-2016. The measures for liquidity are the quick ratio and current 
ratio. We run regressions alternating these two liquidity variables, and the results are similar. We analyse our panel dataset by Panel EGLS Period Weight with the White 
diagonal as our coefficient covariance method. We perform normality tests of the residuals to examine whether our model is well-specified.  




Table 4 Regression results for Greenwashing [ROA3Y used as an operating firm performance indicator] 
 
















Dependent variable  
 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
 peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
 peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
           

































































































variable: Y=1; N=0) 
  -0.1725*** -0.1717***  -0.1525*** -0.0996***  -0.1538*** -0.1017*** 




(0.0263) (0.0258) (0.0263) (0.0275) (0.0263) (0.0274) 
           
Control variables:           










































Quick Ratio  0.6267 
(0.6464) 




   


























































  -0.0258 
(0.0422) 
 
Log (Human Development 
Index) 
0.1956 0.1957 0.1922 0.1858  0.2004 -0.4864* 
(0.2677) 
  -0.4586* 
(0.2676) 






0.1946 0.1948 0.1910 0.1851  0.1992 0.1558  0.2005 0.1559 
*, ** and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
This table shows regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses for Equation 2, where ROA3Y is used as the operating firm performance indicator. Our 
international dataset comprises 1925 large-cap companies headquartered in 47 countries over the period 2012-2016. The measures for liquidity are the quick ratio and current 
ratio. We run regressions alternating these two liquidity variables, and the results are similar. We analyse our panel dataset by Panel EGLS Period Weight with the White 
diagonal as our coefficient covariance method. We perform normality tests of the residuals to examine whether our model is well-specified.  




Table 5 Regression results for Greenwashing [ROA5Y used as an operating firm performance indicator] 
 
















Dependent variable  
 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
 peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
 peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
peer-relative 
greenwashing score  
(Industry-adjusted) 
           

































































































variable: Y=1; N=0) 
















           
Control variables:           




















































   


























































  -0.0257 
(0.0426) 
 
Log (Human Development 
Index) 
0.1997 0.1997 0.1961 0.1895  0.2046 -0.5228* 
(0.2692) 




0.1946 0.1948 0.1910 0.1851  0.1992 0.1590  0.2047 0.1592 
*, ** and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  




This table shows regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses for Equation 2, where ROA5Y is used as the operating firm performance indicator. Our 
international dataset comprises 1925 large-cap companies headquartered in 47 countries over the period 2012-2016. The measures for liquidity are the quick ratio and current 
ratio. We run regressions alternating these two liquidity variables, and the results are similar. We analyse our panel dataset by Panel EGLS Period Weight with the White 
diagonal as our coefficient covariance method. We perform normality tests of the residuals to examine whether our model is well-specified.  




Table 6 Relative importance of company characteristics, country factors, and cross-listing 



















































































































































Log (Board size) -0.0105 
(0.0365) 























































































  -0.1525 
(0.1326) 
     
Industry-adjusted 
ROA3Y 
        -0.0340 
(0.0286) 



























Current Ratio -0.0590 
(0.5468) 


















































R&D Intensity 0.2366** 
(0.1164) 

















  -1.3509*** 
(0.2551) 

























0.1754 0.0555 0.0364 0.1814 0.1946 0.0746 0.0424 0.1991 0.1559  0.1592 0.2005 0.2047 
*, ** and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. This table shows regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses for Equation 2. Our 
international dataset comprises 1925 large-cap companies headquartered in 47 countries over the period 2012-2016. The measures for liquidity are the quick ratio and current 
ratio. We run regressions alternating these two liquidity variables, and the results are similar. We analyse our panel dataset by Panel EGLS Period Weight with the White 
diagonal as our coefficient covariance method. We perform normality tests of the residuals to examine whether our model is well-specified.  
 
  




Appendix Table A-1: Examples of the Bloomberg ESG disclosure matrix and the Asset4 ESG performance score matrix 
 
Examples of the Bloomberg ESG disclosure matrix Examples of the Asset4 ESG performance score matrix 
Environmental 
Direct CO2 emissions 
Indirect CO2 emissions 
CO2 intensity per energy 
Total GHG emissions 
NOx emissions 
SO2 emissions 
Total energy consumption 






% of employees unionized 







Diversity and opportunity 




















Board meeting attendance 
Political donations 
 
Source: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters Eikon.  




Appendix Table A-2: Our sample distribution across countries and territories 
Country 





South Korea 91 
Taiwan 71 
Egypt 2 







Czech Republic 2 


















Australia  55 
South Africa 39 
Luxembourg 6 


















New Zealand 7 
Britain 81 




Source: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters Eikon. Our sample firms are chosen from the firms listed on the MSCI All Country World Index. In this study, we aim to estimate the 
degree to which a company is considered to engage in greenwashing by creating a firm’s relative greenwashing score. A company engaging in greenwashing behavior will 
have a positive greenwashing score. 




Appendix Table A-3: A robustness check - regression results for Greenwashing [ROA used as an operating firm performance indicator] 
































       




































































Cross-listing (dummy variable: Y=1, 
N=0) 








       




Control variables:       
































Quick Ratio  1.0104 
(0.6464) 
  0.7745 
(0.6317) 
 


















































0.1538 0.1541 0.1508 0.1468 0.1557 0.1555 
*, ** and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
This table shows regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses for Equation 2, where ROA is used as the operating firm performance indicator. As a 
robustness check to provide further support for our hypotheses, we replace Log (GDP per capita) with the Human Development Index in Equation (2). By adopting the 
Human Development Index provided by the United Nations, we can control for overall national well-being holistically. We analyse our panel dataset by Panel EGLS Period 
Weight with the White diagonal as our coefficient covariance method. We perform normality tests of the residuals to examine whether our model is well-specified.  




Appendix Table A-4: A robustness check - regression results for Greenwashing [ROA3Y used as an operating firm performance indicator] 
































       




































































Cross-listing (dummy variable: Y=1; 
N=0) 








       




Control variables:       
































Quick Ratio  0.7584 
(0.6550) 
  0.5026 
(0.6426) 
 


















































0.1540 0.1541 0.1510 0.1464 0.1558 0.1559 
*, ** and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
This table shows regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses for Equation 2, where ROA3Y is used as the operating firm performance indicator. As a 
robustness check to provide further support for our hypotheses, we replace Log (GDP per capita) with the Human Development Index in Equation (2). By adopting the 
Human Development Index provided by the United Nations, we can control for overall national well-being holistically. We analyse our panel dataset by Panel EGLS Period 
Weight with the White diagonal as our coefficient covariance method. We perform normality tests of the residuals to examine whether our model is well-specified. 




Appendix Table A-5: A robustness check - regression results for Greenwashing [ROA5Y used as an operating firm performance indicator] 
































       




































































Cross-listing (dummy variable: Y=1; 
N=0) 








       




Control variables:       
































Quick Ratio  0.7071 
(0.7846) 
  0.4077 
(0.7605) 
 


















































0.1574 0.1574 0.1542 0.1494 0.1590 0.1592 
*, ** and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
This table shows regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses for Equation 2, where ROA5Y is used as the operating firm performance indicator. As a 
robustness check to provide further support for our hypotheses, we replace Log (GDP per capita) with the Human Development Index in Equation (2). By adopting the 
Human Development Index provided by the United Nations, we can control for overall national well-being holistically. We analyse our panel dataset by Panel EGLS Period 
Weight with the White diagonal as our coefficient covariance method. We perform normality tests of the residuals to examine whether our model is well-specified.  





Figure 1 Country distribution – ESG disclosure scores vs ESF performance scores, sample period of 2012-2016 
 










































































ESG disclosure score vs ESG performance score


































Source: Authors’ calculations. This figure shows the distribution of the ESG disclosure scores and ESG performance score for our 1925 sample firms over the sample period 
2012-2016. Higher ESG disclosure scores indicate more transparency on ESG issues. The higher the ESG performance scores, the better is ESG performance. 
  




























Source: Authors’ calculations. This figure shows the distribution of our estimated relative greenwashing score.  
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